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April 3, 1981 Conference 
List 1, Sheet 4 
No. 80-1464 
WATT (Sec'y of Interior) 
v. 
Cert to CADC (Robinson, 
Wald & H. Greene [DJ]) 
ENERGY ACTION EDUC. FOUNDATION ET AL. Federal/Civil Timely 
(extension) 
1. SUMMARY: This case invo lves the question whether, under 
the 1978 Amendments to the Outer Continental Lands Act, petr is 






2. FACTS AND DECISION BELOW: The outer c~tinental shelf is 
owned by the federal government and leased to oil companies for oil 
drilling. Until 1978 federal law gave the Secretary of the Interior 
a choice between two bidding systems for allocating leases: (1) 
bidding over the cash bonus, with a fixed royalty to the federal of 
government of not less than 12.5% of the value of oil removed, or 
(2) bidding over the royalty rate, with a fixed cash bonus up front. 
Almost all leases were done on the basis of a cash bonus bid and a 
fixed royalty of 16.67%. 
In 1978, Congress enacted comprehensive amendments to the 
Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, 43 u.s.c. § 1331 et seq. It 
expressed concerns over the almost exclusive use of cash bonus bids, 
based on the view that such bids prevented all but the largest oil 
companies from participating, thus lessening competition for leases 
and leading to a too low return to the federal government. The 
statute provides for a five-year period of experimentation with 
various leasing systems, beginning September 18, 1978, id., § 
1337(a) (5), and lists seven alternative bidding schemes that may be 
used "at the discretion of the Secretary," id., § 1337 (a) (1) . These 
seven include four variations on the traditional cash-bonus bidding. 
Id., § 1337 (a) (1) (A), (C), (D), (F) (cash-bonus, fixed royalty; 
cash-bonus, sliding-scale royalty; cash-bonus, fixed share of net 
profits; cash-bonus, fixed royalty and share of net profits). The 
other three options, id., § 1337 (a) (1) (B), (E), (G), all involve 
fixed cash bonuses and bidding on the rate of subsequent payments, 
through royalties or percentages of net profits or expenditures 
made. Finally, § 1337 (a) (1) (H) authorizes the Secretary to employ 
... ··· '> . . ~~ - ~·-- ·- '" .. -~~ ... ., ... ,. 
) 
3. 
any additional system, with the approval of Congress. During the 
five-year period of experimentation, the Secretary is required to 
employ the first option, the tradi tiona! cash-bonus bidding with a 
fixed royalty rate, to between 40% and 80% of the leases given out, 
while applying other methods to the remaining 20% to 60%. 
This litigation began in 1979, with its purpose being to 
force the Secretary to employ some methods that do not use cash 
bonuses as the bidding component. From the effective date of the 
act, September 18, 1978 until mid-1979, the Secretary had used only 
two methods--the traditional cash-bonus, fixed royalty method and a 
variation involving a sliding-scale royalty. Resps--seven consumer 
groups, three private citizens, two labor organizations, and two 
California governmental entities--brought suit seeking to force use 
of different methods for the leases to be auctioned off in late 
1979. The District Court refused to grant preliminary injunctive 
relief, and the CADC affirmed (Leventhal, J.). The Court of Appeals 
held that the use of only two of the options during the first year 
and the failure of Interior to promulgate regulations covering the 
other options did not constitute a violation of the Act. But it 
left open the possibility that the DC could find a violation of the 
Act if Interior continued to refuse to "experiment among alternative 
bidding systems more widely." 
After the initial CADC decision, regulations were issued 
concerning four of the bidding options, but only one of these four 
involved non-cash-bonus bidding, and it was clear that Interior did 
not intend to try out this option. With respect to other non-cash-
l ..... bonus options, there were no tangible signs of progress toward 
'! ' 
_..._,.,.,_ .. _____ ,.,.,. 
4. 
promulgation of regulations. In the DC, resps sought another 
~ preliminary injunction of pending 1980 leases, as well as summary I ; 
~..... ..... 
judgment. The government also sought summary judgment, arguing that 
it had no obligation to promulgate regulations concerning all of the 
options, and that, even if such an obligation exists, it was 
proceeding at a proper pace. All motions were denied. Resps 
appealed the refusal of the DC to enjoin lease sales in 1980 and 
1981. 
In an initial order the CADC affirmed the denial of a 
preliminary injunction for lease sales last fall. In a subsequent 
opinion, the CADC chose to decide the merits of the dispute, finding 
them to be closely related to the question of a preliminary 
injunction for 1981 leases, and sufficiently illuminated by the 
record below. The court then held' that the purpose of the 1978 
c· amendments was to require experimentation with non-cash-bonus 
bidding, citing various passages from the leg isla ti ve history. It 
rejected the argument that the discretion granted to the Secretary 
includes the discretion to decide not to try out any of the options 
involving bidding on subsequent royalties or subsequent percentages 
of net profit. It also referred to the rejection of an amendment on 
the House floor that would have allowed the Secretary "complete 
flexibility" in this area. In particular the court emphasized the 
. importance of experimentation with the variable net profit share 
option. As relief, the court ordered promulgation of regulations 
covering non-cash-bonus bidding o p tions by mid-1981, prior to the 
next round of lease sales. In a footnote, it rejected the 
government's argument in a post-submission filing that resps lack 
5. 
standing to sue under the citizens' suit provision of the act, 43 
._,.;,~ u.s.c. § 1349 (a). 
C' 
On remand, the parties agreed to an order requiring 
promulgation of regulations covering non-cash-bonus alternatives 
before mid-year. They also stipulated that the Secretary would 
experiment with these options, although this latter stipulation 
became ineffective because it was conditioned on the government's 
decision not to seek cert in this case. 
3. CONTENTIONS: The SG argues that the decision of the 
CADC disregards the plain language of the statute, which vests 
discretion in the Secretary to decide whether to experiment with any 
particular bidding option. The decision imposes unjusti£ied burdens 
on the government, and does so in such a l)-l ill-defined way that the 
J f _, . ~ 
inevitable uncertainty will lead to furiber litigation--impeding the 
development of our ocean oil reserves. The Secretary's discretion 
is made explicit by the statute, and the sole exception is the 
requirement that at least 20% of the leasing over a five-year period 
be done on a basis other than the traditional cash-bonus, fixed 
royalty method. Moreover, the statute even authorizes the Secretary 
to ignore this requirement if he finds that it is inconsistent with 
the purposes and policies of the Act. 43 u.s.c. § 1337(a) (5) (B). 
The court below ignored the plain language of the act in its 
reliance on legislative history. Finally, resps lack standing. The 
consumers among them can allege only a speculative benefit in terms 
of lower prices resulting from increased competition. And the 
California governmental entities have failed to show how they are 
-~ harmed by the present federal program • 
.,'" . ~ . .. .. - .. ..,...... .. ?r--.. -·~"'!'1"1"":!' .... 
6. 
Resps argue against a grant, stating that the standing 
c~ · issue is totally insubstantial, and that the decision below on the 
merits is clearly in line with congressional intent. The standing 
of consumers in this case is supported by the Court's ruling in 
Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330 (1979} (consumer standing in 
the antitrust context}. And the California governmental entities 
have standing based on the fact that it is more difficult for them 
to lease their oil tracts on favorable terms as a result of the fact 
that the federal government is offering such lucrative terms to 
producers. 
Because of the consent order below requiring promulgation 
of non-cash-bonus regulations before mid-year, there is very little 
left for this Court to review. The only conceivable issue is 
whether the CADC was correct in requiring some good-faith 
-. 
( ~ experimentation with such options at some point. This determination 
was very limited and clearly correct, since it left to the Secretary 
the discretion to decide when and how to undertake such 
experimentation. All that the court sought to do was to vindicate 
the clear purpose of the 1978 amendments. 
4. DISCUSSION: It is di ff icul t to determine from these 
papers whether the standing argument has any merit, since that 
question turns on the likelihood that resps have been harmed 
indirectly by the government's leasing policies. On the merits, the 
plain language of the statute does appear to vest complete 
discretion in the Secretary, but t here is much to be said for the 
CADC's view that it is an abuse of discretion to refuse altogether 
to experiment with non-cash-bonus options. There are numerous 
7. 
· references in the legis ative history to the need o try out exactly 
) 
these options. Because the government has now acceded to the only 
---------------- -------
specific relief ordered by the CADC--promulgating regulations 
covering these options--there is a serious question concering 
whether review is warranted at this time. There will only be 
further litigation in this area if the Secretary refuses to apply 
these regulations to any sales at all, thus bringing into question 
the statements in the opinion below referring to the duty of the 
Secretary to do at least some experimentation with these options. 
But this problem may not arise. 
On balance I would probably deny. 
There is a response. 
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Sec;.:_t~~- ~f. the Interior the l~o~r all of the 
b~e~cf in ction 8(a) o~r ~ 
-
Continental Shelf Lands Act. 
Whether consumers of oil and gas, and state 
governmental entities owning off-shore oil and gas lands have 
2. 
standing to challenge the Secretary of the Interior's 
selection of bidding systems? 
I. Background 
In 1953 Congress enacted the Outer Continental Shelf 
Lands Act, 43 u.s.c. § 1331 et seq., authorizing the Secretary 
of the Interior to lease tracts outside of the three mile 
coastal limit to private industry for exploration and 
development. The 1953 OCS Lands Act required that leases be 
let out under either of two bidding systems: (1) a fixed 
~ ----- ..-. ,_. -
royalty of at least 12% with bidding on a cash bonus to be 
paid at the time of the lease award or (2) a fixed cash bonus 
with bidding on the size of the royalty. Prior to the 
Amendments almost all tracts were leased on the basis 
cash bonus bid with a 16 2/3% fixed royalty. 
In 1978 Congress passed extensive 
1/_/~L. .. , 
amendments to the -~~ - //)A_ rt..A-
~~53 Act which authorized the use of new bidding systems. ''~ 
flif Section 205 (a) of the 1978 Act, amending Section 8 (a) (1) of 
~ 1953 Act, provides that the Interior Secretary may use any 
1~1~ of the following bidding systems: 
~ bonus bid with a fixed royalty 
(l) the traditional cash 
of not less than 12% 
(§8 (a) (1) (A)); (2) cash bonus bid with a fixed royalty and a 
fixed share of net profits ( §8 (a) (1) (F) ) ; (l_) cash bonus bid 
~ " with a sliding scale royalty (§8 (a) (1) (C)); (_!) a royalty bid 
with a fixed cash bonus and/or a fixed work commitment 
(§8(a) (1) (B)); (2) a profit share bid with a fixed cash bonus 






bonus and a fixed royalty (§8 (a) (1) (G)); and (]_) a work 
commitment bid with a fixed cash bonus and a slidng scale 
royalty (§8(a)(l)(C). In addition to these bidding systems, 
the Act also authorizes the Secretary of Energy to develop 
other new bidding systems subject to disapproval by Congress. 
§8 (a) (1) (H) • 
The statute requires that regulations implementing 
the bidding systems be promulgated by the Secretary of Energy 
in advance of their use by the Interior Secretary. The amended 
section 8 (a) (1) provides that the selection among the S~M ,, 
---------~ --I(~~ 
enumerate~id~~ sys~e~s is ~be "at the discretion of the ~~. 
PI ·-;) 
Secretary" of the Interior. Howe~er, the Act does set limits ~f 1o 
~ to this discretion. Section 8 (a) (5) (B) directs the Secretary 
to use systems other than the traditional cash bonus bid-fixed 
royalty system in "not less than 20 per centum and not more 
than 60 per centum of the total area offered for leasing each 
year." If the Secretary of the Interior concludes that these 
percentage requirements are "inconsistent with the purposes 
and policies" of the Act he may disregard them, although he 
must explain his reasons to Congress in the annual report on 
the bidding system required in §8 (a) (9) (E). The Secretaries of 
the Interior and of Energy are also required in their annual 
reports on the OCS leasing program to explain why certain of 
the bidding sys terns have not or w i 11 not be used. 4 3 U.S. C. 
§§ 1337 (a) (9) (D), 1343 (2) (A). 
Between September 18, 1978, when the 1978 Act 
became effective, 
filed, the s etary held three lease sales. 
Secretary used the traditional cash bonus-fixed royalty system 
for half of the tracts and the newly authorized cash bonus-
~
sliding scale royalty method for the other half. In no 
instance did he use one of the fixed cash bonus systems. The ~ 
~~ 
Secretary planned to use the same two cash bonus bid systems /~ ~; 
''u~ 
in four more lease sales scheduled between June and November, ~
1979.  
Respondents brought suit in district court chargin~~ 
that the Secretary's continue~se of the cash bonus bid-fixed -
royalty system and his failure to issue regulations for the 
fixed cash bonus bidding methods violated the Act. 
Respondents asked for declaratory and injunctive relief 
leading to the suspension of all leasing until promulgation of 
regulations for the alternate bidding systems. Respondents 
also sought an injunction against any further leasing under 
the cash bonus-fixed royalty method. 
Four days before the scheduled June 25, 1979, lease 
sale, respondents filed a motion for a preliminary injunction 
seeking to prevent further lease sales until regulations were rr-
issued for all of the bidding systems. The district court~. 
denied the motion, and the CADC (Leventhal) affirmed. The CA ~ 
found that the 1978 Amendments continued to authorize the us~~ 
of the cash bonus bid-fixed royalty system and that since 50% ~ 
of the tracts had been offered under a cash bonus-sliding 
5. 
scale royalty the Secretary was well within the percentage 
requirements of §8 (a) (5) (B). The CA noted, however, that 
although the preliminary injunction would not be granted, on a 
trial of the merits in the underlying action the district 
court would be free to consider whether "the Secretary's delay 
in issuing profit-sharing regulations and in failing to 
experiment among alternative bidding systems more widely may 
constitute a violation of the OCS Act amendments." (App' x at 
97a). The case was remanded for further proceedings. 
On remand both parties moved for summary judgment 
and respondents again sought a preliminary injunction to 
prevent imminent lease sales until addi tiona! bidding system 
regulations had been issued. The district court denied all 
motions and set the matter for trial. Respondents again 
appealed from the denial of their motion for a preliminary 
injunction. In an extraordinarily ambiguous opinion, the C 14/3 C. 
CADC --- (Wald) affirmed the district court's denial of preliminary relief but went on to hold that the Secretary of 
Energy h~tutory ~bligation to promulgate regulations_2n 
the major alternatives to cash bonus bidding ~ that the _________ __.....__ -- - ~
Secretary of the Interior has an obligation to experiment with 
these alternatives. Judge Wald argued that since one of the 
. lfh 1' . ~ maJor goa s o t e Act was to open up eas1ng _to compan1es wnv 
... ....... ~ ........................ 
could not afford a front end payment--i.e. the cash 
bonus-- it was not good enough for the Secretary to 
experiment with varieties of the cash bonus bid, he must also 
~ .. 
experiment with those bidding systems--in particular the fixed --c~sh bonus /net prof~are __Qid--that do not include the cash 
bonus as the bid variable. The CA directed the district court 
on remand to insure that regulations for the non-cash bonus 
variable bidding option were promulgated before further lease 
sales. 1 In a long footnote at the end of the opinion, the CA 
also held that respondents had standing to bring this action. 
The Secretaries of the Interior and of Energy now /3~ 
S:..u.«..~ 
argue before this Court that the CA erred in finding that 
respondents had standing to challenge their administration of 
the Act and that the CA erred in ordering them to issue and 
then to use regulations for the major fixed cash bonus bid 
alternatives. Of these two arguments, the question of 
standing is the more difficult. 
- II. Standing 
Respondents are two California governmental 
entities--the State of California and the City of Long Beach--
1Prior to the appeal the Secretary of Energy had 
issued bidding system regulations for the cash bonus-fixed 
royalty system, for the royalty bid-fixed cash bonus system, for 
the cash bonus-sliding scale royalty system, and for the cash 
bonus bid-fixed net profit share system. Following the appeal, 
the government agreed to an order requiring the Department of 
Energy to issue regulations for a net profit share bid-fixed cash 
bonus bidding system and for a work commitment bid-fixed cash 
bonus and fixed royalty bidding system. Regulations have not 
been proposed for the cash bonus bid-fixed royalty and fixed net 
profit share, for the work commitment bid-fixed cash bonus and 
fixed sliding scale royalty system, or for the royalty bid-fixed 
work commitment bidding system. 
7. 
nine consumer and labor organizations, and three private 
citizen-taxpayers. Their standing to bring this action has ~ 
received surprisingly little attention from the courts below.~ 
Judge Wald disposed of the matter in a long footnote to her 
"/;,./;;i;;~. ,, 
opinion~ Judge Leventhal made no mention at all of the ~ 
/AAA.t.A-
problem in the CADC's first opinion in this litigation. 
Nonetheless the standing question here is substantial and 
difficult, particularly in light of your opinions in Warth v. 
Seldin, 422 u.S. 490 (197 5) and Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare 
Rights Org. (EKWRO), 426 U.S. 26 (1976). 
On appeal and in their briefs before this court, 
respondents lay three claims to standing: (1) the consumer ~ 
and labor organizations and the three private citizens argue ;-
It \" '../ _ 
that they have standing as 'Consumers of oil and gas~ (2) p...-z_ 
,, 'II 
California and the City of Long Beach argue that as owners of ~~ 
·~~~•I 
off-shore property that is leased in competition with federal ' 
,, \'). ... 'L.v -~ • 
leases, they have standing as competitors of the federal 
government, and (3) C~lifornia argues that as a co-owner with 
the federal government of oil and gas pools that straddle the 
· It ,, 
thr~t, it has standing as a co-lessor. 
In this section I look closely at these three 
standing claims and reach the very tentative conclusion that 
these parties do not have standing to sue. I first summarize 
the current law of standing~ I do so only briefly given your 
knowledge of this area. 
A. The Law of Standing 
8. 
You have stated the principles governing standing in 
Warth v. Seldin. Standing has both a constitutional and a 
prudential dimension. As a constitutional matter, standing is 
part of the the Article III requirement of a "case or 
controversy." To establish standing under Article III, the 
plaintiff must allege actual or threatened injury to himself--
"a distinct and palpable injury"--and must allege causation: 
the injury must be one that "fairly can be traced to the 
t(~: 
challenged action of the defendant," such "that the exercise 
~ 
of the Court's remedial powers would redress the claimed ~
injuries." Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Env. Study Group, 438 ~ 
u.s. 59, 74 (1978). 
The requirements of 
~ 
injury and causation are~~ 
irreducible constitutional minima that must be met in every 
v' 
case. As you stated in Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of 
Bellwood, 441 u.s. 91, 100 (1979), although Congress may 
expand the courts' jurisdiction to the limits of Article III, 
and may overcome prudential barriers to standing, it may not 
waive the Article III minima of injury in fact and causation. 
Yet Congress may have some control over standing even at the 
constitutional level. By its power to create a legal 
interest, and thus an "injury" to that interest, Congress may 
in effect create standing. Moreover, the questions of injury 
and causation are questions of fact on which Congress may hold 
an opinion. Where Congress has found that certain persons are 
injured and that the cause of their injury may be attributed 
' . 
9. 
to the actions of the defendant they attack, the Court may 
hesitate to disagree. 
As to the prudential limits on standing, the Court 
is wary of litigants who, although meeting the requisites of 
Article III, assert an injury that is "shared in substantially 
equal measure by all or a large class of citizens." Warth, 
422 u.s. at 499. 
war, 418 u.s. 208 
See Schlesinger 
(1974); / United 
v. Reservists to Stop the 
-r. ~Jz.M.t~  ~A 
States v. Ri~Ard~on, 418~~ 
C/R a.Gf 
u.s. 166 (1974). The Court looks with disfavor as well upon 
litigants who rest their claim for relief on the legal rights 
of third parties. Finally, the Court demands that litigants 
seeking to assert a claim based upon a statutory framework, 
show that their interest is indeed "within the zone 
interests to be protected or regulated" by the statute. Data 
Processing Service v. Camp, 39 7 U.S. 150 (1969) ; EKWRO, 426 
u.s. at 39 n.l9. All three of these prudential limitations 
reflect the Court's desire not to be drawn into controversies 
that are best handled by one of the other branches of 
government. 
appears 
Although the above principles are clear, the Court 
to apply them with varying degrees of stringency. 
Generally, the Court is much more generous in finding standing 
in environmental cases than elsewhere. Thus, in Duke Power 
Co. v. Carolina Evironmental Study Group, Inc, 438 U.S. 59 
(1978), the Court found that an environmental group had 




Anderson Act although its claims of injury were somewhat 
insubstantial and although the chain of causation from passage 
of the Price Anderson Act to the construction of the two 
nuclear power plants supposed to have caused them injury was 
attenuated a~ . best. Moreover, the Court found standing 
despite tR.e generality of the harm and, more significantly, 
~ 
despite the admonition against permitting litigants to raise 
the claims of third parties. By permitting this plaintiff ~ 
attack the Act's limitation on liability for nuclear 
accidents, even though its injuries were in no way related to 
such an accident, the Court, in effect, permitted the 
plaintiff to argue on behalf of potential tort victims. In 
other environmental cases the Court has taken a similarly 
generous view of both the Article III and prudential limits on 
standing. See United States v. SCRAP, 412 u.s. 669 
(1973) (Court finds standing despite "attenuated line of 
causation," id at 688, and despite universal nature of the 
injury); Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972) (widely 
shared noneconomic harm may amount to "injury in fact"). 
~~~~ 
By contrast, your decisions in Warth and EKWRO were 
far more exacting, particularly in their insistence that a 
more than "speculative" causal link be alleged between the 
injury suffered and the action of the defendant subject to 
attack. See Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 u.s. 614 (1973). 
You were perhaps not quite so demanding in Gladstone, Realtors 
v. Village of Bellwood, 441 u.s. 91 (1979), in which the Court 
11. 
found that the allegation in the complaint that racial 
steering was causing economic and social injury to the 
plaintiffs sufficed to establish standing. See Arlington 
Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Corp., 429 u.s. 252 (1977). 
Yet although Gladstone and Arlington Heights may indicate 
something of a retreat from EKWRO and Warth, all four of these 
~
cases indicate the Court's determination that particularly 
causation may not be shown by "unadorned speculation." In 
this insistence, these cases differ from the environmental 
cases. 2 
B. Standing of the Parties 
The standing of the parties in this litigation must 
be determined on a rather inadequate record. The trial court 
made no factfindings with respect to standing, and thus the 
Court does not have the luxury of defering to its findings. 
See Duke Power. The allegations of injury in the complaint 
--------------------------------------are brief and conclusory. Indeed, one of the asserted bases 
for standing in the complaint--that the citizen respondents 
2whether the distinction drawn between standing in 
environmental cases and standing elsewhere can be defended 
theoretically is less clear. Perhaps the environmental cases 
are--as Justice Douglas argued--in the nature of in rem actions. 
Perhaps the Court believes that unlike other cases in which it 
may be expected that better litigants will appear--litigants who 
are more clearly and more directly injured--such cannot be 
expected in environmental suits in which the injury is aesthetic, 
abstract, and general. Thus the Court in Warth may have been 





-- J+ /'J.v(I((.A. J.c:A...- /./ ____ ~~ / .... -: •• ~ 
,~ ~ ~~~)
cl-~f4t~~ 
have standing as taxpayers--is no longer urged 3 , while the ~ 
/( ' _} -claim that California has standing as a co-lessor, perhaps the ~. 
strongest of all of the standing claims, is nowhere made in 
the complaint but was apparently developed for the first time -----
on appeal. Nor is the Court required to accept such bare 
Although it is a general 
rule of standing that the "reviewing courts must accept as 
true all material allegations of the complaint, and must 
construe the complaint in favor of the complaining party," 
Warth, 422 U.s. at 501, this rule of construction does not 
absolve a complainant of "the responsibility . clearly to 
allege facts demonstrating that he is a proper party to invoke 
judicial resolution of the dispute." Warth, 422 u.s. at 518. 
Perhaps the standing issue was not litigated more ~1-
vigorously below because of the Act's explicit provision for  
citizen suits. 
~
,,,..~ L_ " .. . 
Section 208(a) of the Act, 43 u.s.c. § 1349 - ......... 
provides: 
• It • • 
any £ e f .SOn hav1ng a val1d legal 1nterest 
which i~. or rna~ be adve~sely af~ected may commence a 
civil ac t ion on his own behal~~o-compel compliance 
with this subchapter against any per son, including 
the United States, and any other government 
instrumentality or agency for any alleged 
violation of any provision of this subchapter or any 
regulation promulgated under this subchapter, or of 
the terms of any permit or lease issued by the 
Secretary under this subchapter. 







Yet, as we have seen above, the provision for citizen suits  
llj A•' 
cannot give the Court jurisdiction where Article III injury in ~r.&ce~ 
fact and causation are missing. Nor is it necessarily certain t.j, C::ZV I-!J[' 
..... ~j 
that a challenge to the Secretary's bidding regulations is the Q -~~ 
~~ 
sort of citizen suit envisioned by the Congress, although 
quite clearly the provision for citizen suits is of great~ 
significance in considering whether Congress has removed the~ 
prudential limits to standing. 
One final point to note before turning to the 
particular claims to standing here is that the Court need not 
determine that all of the plaintiff's have standing to assert 
jurisdiction. It is enough to establish the Court's 
jurisdiction if at least one of the plaintiffs has standing. 
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 u.s. 1, 12 (1976). But see Gladstone, 
supra (having found that the village of Bellwood had standing, 
the Court went on to consider whether individual homeowners 
had standing as well). 
1. Consumers 
Judge Wald found that it was "readily apparent" _!hat ~ !._) 
the consumer plaintiffs had standing to sue for violation of 
an Act "designed to increase competition and to step up 
utilization of energy resources on the" outer continental 
shelf: "Consumers are the ultimate beneficiaries of both 
vigorous competition and greater availability of domestic 
fuel." And indeed, the complaint does allege in some detail 
that the effect of the Secretary's reliance on the cash-bonus 
•,' ... 
, 
·~z....c.~~~~- ,-u~~t M - .&tc 14 • 
~ ~ ~ /)L~-t>#~ 
~~ ~~ 72u__ 
~-~-~~~~~~ 
bidding syste~ - i~ to restrict bidding to the large oil g( 
. d h h . h . t' t ~ companies an t at t ese companies ave counter Incen I ves o 
rapid development of the leases. Jt. Appx. 39-49. Yet even 
~ 
if it were true, as alleged, that the use of the cash-bonus
bidding system has these effects, it does not necessarily 
~ 
follow that consumers are thereby injured. 
To begin with, if smaller, independent 
were to bid in competition with the big companies, it 
well be that the increased competition among bidders would 
result in lease terms more favorable to the lessor--the --government. But more favorable terms to the government mean 
higher costs to the producer and thus well may lead to 
higher--not lower--prices to the consumer. In order to -----
establish their injury, the consumer's would have to argue 
that whatever the increase in costs to lessees, these costs 
would be so outmatched by the increase in supply that prices 
would decline. Yet the supply side of their argument is no ~ 
less speculative. It is unclear that shifting to different ~ 
bidding systems will yield an overall increase in supply, even~~~ 
if it is true that smaller companies are more anxious to 
develop their leases than are the large companies. As the 
government notes, the cash-bonus method discourages the oil 
companies from stockpiling, rather than developing their 
leases. Thus, whatever the gain in supply from small 
companies that may result from adopting other bidding systems 
may be balanced by a possible decrease in incentives to 
15. 
develop for the larger companies. 
Moreover, even were it true that the use of 
different bidding systems would lead to an increase in supply, 
it is most unclear that this increase would translate into a 
lower price or even into greater retail supply. The cost of 
oil to the consumer is determined by a multitude of factors in 
addition to the price of crude oil including the costs of 
transportation, refining and marketing. And even were it true 
in a free market that increases in supplies of crude should 
ultimately translate into lower prices at the pump, it is 
obvious that the world oil market is not free but is 
controlled by a cartel. Given this control and the country's 
dependence on imported oil, it is most unclear that any 
incremental increase in supply from the outer continental 
shelf will have any effect on overall price or supply to the 
consumer. In short if there is injury it is as much the 
result of an oil cartel as the choice of bidding systems and 
whether an order by this Court would redress the injury may be 
doubted. 
Finally, all of the above uncertainties exist even 
accepting the consumers' basic premise that different leasing 
systems will increase competition and will increase the 
participation of the small companies. But this premise is 
itself subject to considerable doubt--a doubt which is not 
alleviated by the absence of any small producers among the 
plaintiffs to this suit. 
16. 
Certainly both injury and causation here are far 
~- --
more , speculative than in the typical consumer suit. Thus, in --------Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 u.s. 330 (1979), without 
addressing the question as a matter of standing, the Court 
held that consumers could be injured by antitrust violations 
within the meaning of §4 of the Clayton Act. The Court 
silently assumed that such consumers had standing for purposes 
of Article III. But the allegation of injury to a limited 
class of purchasers resulting from specific antitrust 
violations would appear to be far less attenuated than the 
claims here. Similarly, a challenge to agency action directly 
permitting price increases of oil and gas again lays claim to 
an injury and a source of injury far more certain than here. 
See Consumers Union of United States, Inc. v. Sawhill, 525 
F.2d 1068 (TECA 1975). 
Article III may appear to be little more than "an ingenious 
exercise in the conceivable." SCRAP, 412 U.S. at 688. On the 
..:::...:::...--------- -~-~ 
other hand, it may be argued that if, after hearings and 
consultation with the industry and the agency, Congress itself -----...... 
was prepared to believe the "ingenious exercise," then, so, 
too, should the Court. Certainly the legislation reflects~~ 
Congress' view that other bidding systems may prove to be -------better sui ted than the cash bonus system in J'~ssur ing supply ~' 
competition, and fair return to the government. And one may 
argue with Judge Wald that the consumers' inability to be more 
17. 
specific as to their injury is in part due to the agency's own 
failure to test all of the bidding systems. 
I think that there is considerable strength to this 
reply. Although the Court retains the responsibility to 
determine whether it has jurisdiction under Article III, to 
the extent that the question of Article III standing--injury 
and causation--is one of fact, Congress may well be in a 
better position than the Court to find the facts in a 
complicated situation such as the one here. At the least, 
Congress' position may be persuasive although not controlling. 
Yet the strength of this argument is tempered by 
several considerations. First, the argument tends to merge 
with the merits. Thus, Judge Wald argues that "by mandating -----____.-"' 
use of non-cash bidding systems Congress has recognized a 
causal nexus between government [outer continental shelf] 
activities and competition and energy production." If the 
Court concludes, however, that the CA was wrong as to the 
merits and that Congress did not "mandate" the use of all of 
the bidding systems, then the Court is left with a somewhat 
more tentative congressional conclusion that there may be a 
causal nexus between bidding systems and competition and 
energy production. 
Nor is it clear that Congress believed that 
consumers would necessarily be the beneficiaries of such 
experimentation. Although Congress may have believed that 





aims of increased production, increased federal revenue, and 
increased competition in the oil industry, the legislative 
history does not show that Congress believed that any of these 
goals would benefit the consumer as opposed to the industry, -
the government qua lessor, and the defense and foreign policy 
posture of the nation. Perhaps it may be assumed that 
Congress had the consuming public in mind in seeking to 
maintain supply--and · the citizen suit provision may support 
this assumption--yet respondents and the opinion below fail to 
cite to specific instances in the legislative history where 
this concern for the consumer is evinced. 
If we assume that Congress intended consumers to be 
benefitted by §8 (a) (1) and if the Court is willing to accept 
this judgment perhaps injury and causation may be shown. But 
even if it is conceded that consumers can show injury and 
causation under Article III, there are still weighty 
prudential considerations against their claim to standing. 4 
To begin with, consumers assert an injury which is widely 
shared, indeed which is shared by the entire public. As a 
prudential matter the Court prefers litigants with more 
definite claims of injury. Such claims assure adver sar iness 
4Because we are assuming that Congress beleived consumers 
would be benefitted by other leasing systems, we are assuming as 




and they keep the Court from being drawn into disputes which 
may best be settled in the legislative or political forum. 
When the entire public may be said to be injured, the Court 
properly questions whether the dispute should not be resolved 
through the ballot rather than the brief. Although in the 
environmental context, the Court has accepted such generalized 
claims of injury it may do so in that context by default--no 
better plaintiffs may be thought to exist. But better 
plaintiffs do exist in this affair. Whether or not Congress 
sought to benefit consumers by increasing competition in 
bidding and by decreasing the position of the big oil 
companies, it certainly so~ght to benefit smaller oil 
producers. These are the logical plaintiffs to challenge the 
Secretary's choice of bidding systems, not consumers. And yet 
plaintiffs include no small oil producers among their numbers. 
Congress may be thought to have removed the 
~ \ ' prudential considerations by virtue of the citizen suit 
provision. Yet'" it is u nlikely that Congress intended for 
__, 
citizens to bring a lawsuit such as this. The House report 
suggests that the citizen suit provision was designed to 
permit suits by environmental groups: 
the scope of persons who can sue are those who can 
show an ' <actual interest ' \ that is being negatively 
affected . : : tfi e - interest must be discernible and 
ascertainable. Standing to sue includes not only 
those who have an economic interst • but also 
those who may have a definable aesthetic or 
environmental interest. Specifically, the Committee 
intends tht this includes persons who meet the 
requir~ing to sue set out by the 
Supreme Court in Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 u.s. 727 
(1972). 
20. 
The Act is replete with environmental requirements and the 
legislative history suggests that pressure from environmental 
groups was a significant factor in the shaping of the 
legislation. 
Had Congress intended suits by consumers it 
certainly knew how to state this intent explicitly. See 
§18 (e) (1) (A) of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 u.s.c. 
§57 (a) (e) (1) (A) ( 11 any intersted person (including a consumer 
or consumer organization) may file a petition 11 in the court of 
appeals). Moreover, that Congress did not intend for consumer 
actions to oversee the Secretary's adherance to §8(a) (1) is 
further suggeted by the Act's careful provision for 
congressional oversight of the bidding process. Thus, §207 
requires the Secretary in an annual report to provide the 
Congress with 11 an evaluation of the competitive bidding 
systems permitted under the provisions of section 1337 of this 
title, and, if applicable, the reasons why a particular 
bidding system has not been utilized ... 43 u.s.c. § 
1343 (2) (A). See also 43 u.s.c. § 1337 (a) (9) (secretary of 
energy to make a similar report); 43 u.s.c. § 1337 (a) (8) ( 11 Not 
later than thirty days before any lease sale, the Secretary 
shall submit to the Congress and publish in the Federal 
Register a notice-- (A) identifying any bidding system which 
I 
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will be utilized for such lease sale and the reasons for the 
utilization of such bidding system.") Congress assigned to 
itself the task of supervising the Secretry's use of bidding 
systems. The consumers would ask the Court to join them in 
usurping Congress's role. This is precisely the sort of 
overreaching that the standing doctrine is designed to 
control. Certainly the Court may require a clearer 
congressional intent to waive prudential barriers to standing 
before doing so here. ~ 
In sum, the consumers' claim to standing is tenuous ~ 
at best under Article III and is even less convincing in light 
of the prudential limitation on standing. Thus, even if the 
Article III claim could be made more convincing by more 
detailed allegations or perhaps through recasting the claim of 
injury, 5 the prudential limitations would still stand as a 
5If we continue to assume that Congress intended 
consumers to be benefitted by the Act and the provision for 
experimentation among bidding systems, then one might construct 
an even more powerful argument for injury and causation--albeit 
an argument respondents do not put forward. It might be argued 
that the statute gives to consumers the right to learn whether 
other bidding systems would better serve them. Even if the 
answer is no or even if the answer is inconclusive, consumers are 
injured simply by the Secretary's failure to use the different 
bidding systems. The complexities of the world oil market and 
the economics of lease bidding become irrelevant to this claim of 
standing. Whether or not consumers can show that they are harmed 
in the pocket by the use of one bidding system or another, they 
have lost the chance to learn and that is enough. 
~ But this claim of standing, if more convincing as a 
matter of Article III, is even less able to satisfy the 
prudential limitations. It may be doubted that Congress had such 
Footnote continued on next page. 
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barrier. 
(2) Competing Lessors (~) 
to standing is by far the The competitors' claim 
weakest claim of the three and can be disposed of briefly. ---------Judge Wald found that California and Long Beach as competing 
lessors had standing to challenge the Secretary's failure to 
use all of the bidding systems: "These two appellants posit a 
present and future disadvantage to their own [outer 
continental shelf] activity by their inability to compete for 
bidders who are attracted to the significantly higher returns 
to private investment available through federal lease." As 
the government is quick to point out, however, this claim of 
standing conflicts with that of the consumers'. The consumers 
argue that the use of different bidding systems will increase 
interest in federal leases and lead to lower prices; the 
competi tiors argue that the different bidding systems will 
decrease interest in federal leases and end the ability of 
federal leaseholders to "market their oil and gas at far lower 
rates" than California leaseholders. (Red brief at 42) 
This conflict is a symptom of the tenuousness of 
both sets of claims. Certainly the competitors' claim to 
injury and causation is no less speculative than that of the 
an abstract interest in mind when providing a citizen suit for 
persons who could show "an actual" "discernible and 
ascertainable" interest that was negatively affected. 
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consumers': it is unclear that competition for state leases 
is in any way affected by the availability or terms of the 
federal leases. Nor is there any indication that Congress 
thought that state competitors would be benefitted by the 
experimentation among bidding systems. Thus, the competitors 
are unable to enlist congressional belief in support of their 
claims of injury and causation, while, as a prudential matter, 
it appears that competitors of the federal government were not 
within the legislation's "zone of interests." ~ ~ 
3. Co-Lessors ( ~ ~ U.J 
California apparent r;/ ~aimed for hfrt st time o:? ~ 
appeal that it had standing as a co-lessor. Judge Wald found ~ ~t..J, 
that the state "could obtain a higher return in so-called ~ 
-----------------~----
'drainage' situations if appellees would utilize higher return 
bidding systems. In drainage situations the state is part 
owner with the federal government of an [outer continental 
shelf] site and shares in royalties guaranteed by a lease on 
the site." The state argues that if the federal government 
used other bidding systems less generous to the oil companies 
a better return would be provided to both the federal and 
state governments in co-leasing situations. 
Again this claim of injury is subject to the same 
uncertainties as a matter of economics that plague the other 
------------~---------------------/ 
claims of standing as well. It is uncertain that the other 
bidding systems provide any greater return to the lessor. 
Again, one may argue that if Congress believed tht there was a 
24. 
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likelihood that other bidding systems would yield a higher /.. 7:_.. 
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return, that should be good enough for the Court. But even  
t . th t t th' 1 . f t ~d' . ~b' t:Z!I!&t 'I accep 1ng a argumen , 1s c a1m o s an 1ng 1s su Jec o 
additional uncertainties. First, there is no requireme~
the Act that the Secretary use the experimental bidding 
systems on any particular tract. The Act requires only that 
he use the experimental bidding methods in at least 20% and no 
more than 60% of leases. It is likely that in any particular 
lease, the Secretary will use a variant of the traditional 
cash bonus bid if not the cash bonus bid-fixed royalty method 
itself. The relief requested by the competitors--that the 
Secretary be ordered to experiment with noncash bonus bids--is 
by no means likely to redress the injury alleged.6 
Second, even assuming that cash bonus bidding may 
yield a lower rate of return to the lessor, it is unclear that 
the state as a co-lessor would suffer even if the federal 
government decided to use the cash bonus method in co-leasing 
situations. The Act includes a provision under which the 
6 rn Arlington Heights, 429 u.s. 252 (1977) the Court 
found standing although there was some uncertainty that the 
housing project would be built even if the Court held the zoning 
restriction unconstitutional. But there it was much more certain 
that the project would go forward than it is here that the 
Secretary will use an experimental bidding system in co-leasing 
situations. Moreover, it was at least clear in Arlington Heights 
that a Court order would stop any attempt to block the project 
through zoning whatever other uncertainties may have remained. 
Here a Court order will not even stop the one injury complained 
of--the use of cash bonus bidding. 
.. 
25. 
state as a co-lessor can go into federal district court in 
order to assure itself a "fair and equitable" return on a 
joint lease. 43 U.S.C.§ 1337(g} (2}-(4}. Presumably the state 
could argue that the federal lease uses a bidding system that 
favors certain federal goals--e.g. quick production--over 
maximum revenue to the lessors and that therefore the state 
should receive more than a pro rata share. And if the state's 
injury becomes less certain on account of this provision, it 
also becomes less clear as a prudential matter that Congress 
intended for co-lessors to have the benefit of the citizen 
suit provision for purposes of challenging the Secretary's 
choice of bidding methods. Since Congress provided an 
explicit remedy for co-lessors who were disappointed with 
their take under a co-leasing arrangement, it seems unlikely 
that Congress also intended that these same co-lessors could 
challenge the Secretary's administration of the Act in advance 
of any specific grievance as to any specific lease. 
Summary and Conclusion: I think that a strong case 
can be made on both Article III and prudential grounds that 
none of the respondents in this action have standing. But I 
am not at all sure that I have reached the right conclusion. 
If standing is to be found, the best standardbearers are the -
co-lessors. By finding standing in the co-lessors the Court 
may avoid holding that consumers have standing under the Act, 
which would be a holding of grave significance to future 




By contrast to the standing question, the question 
on the merits seems quite a bit simpler. Judge Wald found 
ample evidence in the legislative history that Congress 
intended to require the Secretary to experiment with different 
leasing methods. The House Committe Report states that "[o]ne 
purpose of H.R. 1614 is to authorize alternative leasing 
arrangements and require experimentation with them." The 
purpose of providing the Secretary with alternative bidding 
methods, the House explained, was "to determine what system or 
systems in what situations, provide the best means to lease 
our federal resources in the Outer Continental Shelf. 
Subsection (a) is intended to provide procedures to answer 
this question ••. to mandat[e] use of new systems, to insure 
they are tested and studied, and to provide for random 
selection, to insure fair tests and studies." The Conference 
.......___ = 
Committee report similarly emphasizes that the Secretary is to . ---------
experiment with the new leasing systems "to assure that 
adequate information is obtained as to relative advantages and 
disadvantages of the various bidding systems." 
Moreover, Judge Wald found in the legislative 
history the particular determination on the part of Congress 
that the non-cash bonus variable bidding systems be tried 
during the five year period of experimentation. The Congress 
was especially interested to see if smaller oil companie 
' ' 
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could be induced to enter the bidding if systems were used 
that did not require large front end payments. Thus, the 
Senate Report stated that the new bidding systems were 
"designed to reduce the front end cash bonus, increase the 
government's return on actual production of oil or gas, make 
it easier for smaller companies to enter the OCS development 
business, and increase the availability of funds for 
exploration." Similarly, the House Report states that "[i]t 
was the intention of the Committee that there be a clear 
mandate given to the Secretary to require him to use bidding 
systems other than the cash bonus bid." The Conference Report 
emphasizes that "Bidding systems other than bonus bidding, 
including royalty, net profit, work commitment, and 
nonenumerated systems are to be utilized in at least 20 
percent and not more than 60 percent of the tracts offered for 
leasing in all OCS areas during each of the next 5 years." 
In view of these statements in the legislative 
history, Judge Wald concluded that the Secretary had an 
certainly to test the noncash bonus bidding 
alternatives if not to test all of the experimental bidding 
systems. By rejecting the non-bonus bidding systems, the 
Secretary was rejecting the systems that Congress thought 
might increase competition and access for smaller companies--
one of the chief goals of the legislation. By refusing to use 
the major non-bonus bidding systems, the Secretary defeats the 
Act's goal of experimentation. To these two arguments, 
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respondents add that the Act requires leasing activities to be 
conducted so as "to assure receipt of fair market value for 
the lands leased." 43 u.s.c. §1344(a) (4). The Secretary 
cannot assure fair value until he tests the profit share 
bidding system which has worked so well in California. It was 
because Congress doubted that the cash bonus bidding system 
was yielding the government a proper return that it passed the 
fair market value provision and required the Secretary to 
experiment with other leasing systems. 
On the other side is the specific language of the -
statute. Section 8(a) (1) of the Act states that the choice of 
the bidding systems shall be "at the discretion of the 
Secretary." Although that discretion is limited, the explicit 
limitation states only that the Secretary is not to use 
alternative (A)--the traditional cash bonus/fixed royalty bid-
-in more than 60% or less than 20% of the leases in each year 
for the coming five years. The limitation nowhere indicates 
that the Secretary must use any particular alternative to the 
cash bonus/fixed royalty bid. Moreover, the Act permits the 
Secretary to disregard even these percentage limitations if he 
determines that they are inconsistent with the purposes and 
policies of the Act. In light of this provision, the 
government suggests that it would be inappropriate to imply a 
requirement that the Secretary use leasing alternatives he has 
found to be less sui table than others. Finally, the statute 
explicitly contemplates that the Secretary may not use certain 
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of the bidding systems in any particular year. Thus, 43 
u.s.c. §§ 1337 (a) (9) and 1343 (2) (A) provide that the 
Secretaries of Energy and Interior shall report, if 
applicable, "the reasons why a particular bidding system has 
not been or will not be utilized." 
I find that the statutory language settles the 
question on the merits. As you have stated so often,"the 
starting point in every case involving construction of a 
statute is the language itself." Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor 
Drug Stores, 421 u.s. 723, 756 (1975) (Powell, J., concurring). 
The statute clearly contemplates that the Secretary may not 
use all of the bidding systems in any year while to the extent 
that the Secretary's discretion is limited, it is not limited 
in a way that requires him to use any one or all of the 
various alternative bidding systems. The Secretary may be 
defeating the congressional hope that he would experiment 
broadly; but it would seem from the language of the statute 
that he is not defeating any congressional command. 
Nor is the legislative history so clear that the -----------
Secretary was to be required to test all of the bidding 
alternatives. Much of the mandatory language in the Reports 
refers only to the Secretary's general duty to try out some 
systems in addition to the traditional cash bonus bid. The 
language need not be read to require the Secretary to try each 
of the different alternatives. See e.g. House Report, at 139 
("It was the intention of the Committee that there be a clear 
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mandate given to the Secretary to require him to use bidding 
systems other than the cash bonus bid.") Moreover, as the 
government argues, the phrase "cash bonus system" or "bonus 
bidding" was used in the legislative history to refer 
specifically to the traditional cash bonus-fixed royalty--not 
collectively to all of the alternative using a cash bonus bid. 
With this in mind, various statements in the Reports to the 
effect that the Secretary must use bidding systems in addition 
to "cash bonus bidding" can be understood to refer not simply 
to the systems which include a fixed or no cash bonus but to 
all of the suggested systems including those using a cash 
bonus bid. Indeed, such an interpretation is consistent with 
Congress's desire to reduce the size of the initial cash 
payment, for certain of the new cash bonus bidding systems 
also promise to reduce the size of the cash bonus. As the 
size of the payments to be made during the life of the lease 
is increased--as with the cash bonus bid-fixed net profit 
share bidding system--the less bidders will be willing to pay 
{and bid) up front. 
IV. Conclusion 
In sum, the language of the statute rather strongly 
I I "' indicates that the Secretary was neither ordered to promulgate 
nor to use any one of the alternatives to the traditional cash 
bonus bid. He was required to experiment, but it was left to ... 
his discretion as to which of the bidding alternatives he 
would chose to test. The legislative history does not compel 
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a different reading of the statute although certain statements 
might indicate a duty by the Secretary to try out all of the 
alternatives. Perhaps in the end the question comes down to 
which is a better indication of congressional intent: the 
language of the statute or the legislative history? I do not 
think that you have any difficulty answering this question. 
But if the merits are rather easy, the standing 
issue is quite troubling. All of the standing claims suffer 
from an inability to show causation with any certainty. And 
even if the Article III question is resolved in respondents' 4 A-fA.~ 
favor on the basis that Congress believed that consumers, ~J-D 
competitors, and co-lessors might be benefitted by the
Secretary's use of different bidding systems, weighty 
prudential considerations remain to challenge the claim of 
standing. As to the consumers, the Court may hesitate to 
credit such a generalized claim of injury particularly when 
Congress has assigned itself the task of overseeing the 
bidding systems. As to the competitors, there is simply no 
indication that Congress intended these plaintiff/respondents 
to be within the zone of interests of the Act. Finally, the 
Act provides disappointed co-lessors with a specific means to 
litigate when and if they are dissatisfied with their return 
from a federal lease in a drainage situation. In suggesting 
such a specific remedy after a dispute develops between the 
state and the federal government, the statute suggests that 
the co-lessor's bringing of this suit is premature. But 
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although I do not think that there is standing here, nor do I 
think that any great harm will be done if the Court finds that 
co-lessors have standing and goes on to reach the merits. 
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1001 CONNECTICUT AVENUE, N. W. 
WASHINQTON, 0. C. 20036 
September 30, 981 
The Honorable Alexander L. Stevas 
Chief Clerk of the Supreme Court 
of the United States 
1 First Street, N.E. 
Washington, D.C. 20543 
Dear Mr. Stevas: 
202·381·171U5 
On Monday, 0 ober Y, I will be presenting the argument for 
respondents in o. 80-1464, James G. Watt v. Energy Action. 
During the ar ument I may ant to refer to a recent communica-
tion of Septe er 14, L 1 from petitioner James G. Watt to the 
Congress of the · ed States in response to certain written 
congressional questions. Enclosed is a copy of that communica-
tion and some of the attachments thereto. 
I am lodging this material with you so that it will be 
available to the Justices at the argument if they desire copies 
of the communication by Secretary Watt. 
JS:cm 
Enclosures 
cc: Louis F. Claiborne 
Deputy Solicitor General 
lJnited States Department of the Interior 
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY 
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20240 
Honorable Carroll Hubbard 
Chairman, Subcommittee on Panama Canal/ 
Outer Continental Shelf 
U.S. House of Representatives 
Washington, D.C. 20515 
Dear Mr. Hubbard: 
SEP 14 19&1 
Enclosed are responses to the written questions you forwarded subsequent to 
fhe testimony before your Subcommittee on June 2, 1981. 
We appreciate the Subcommittee's interest in the Outer Continental Shelf 
oil and gas leasing program and look forward to working with you and the 




Jones and Hubbard 
Question #7. In a recent newspaper article, you were reported to state 
that more OCS acreage should be leased because prices have risen so high 
under the bonus bid system that "unless you are a huge international 
company, you don•t have the opportunity to bid." Would not the implemen-
tation of alternative bidding systems help alleviate this problem? 
Answer. Constraints on participation of medium and smaller companies 
ar1se not only from the high cash bonuses on the better prospects but also 
from the high costs of exploration and development on all prospects. 
Alternative bidding systems reduce the level of cash bonus and may allow 
more medium and smaller firms to participate. However, tests of alternative 
systems to date do not show any strong effect of this type. On the other 
hand, some systems tend to decrease the attractiveness of OCS prospects 
for investment in exploration and to cause inefficient and sometimes 
reduced development and production. For instance, a bidding system based 
upon a royalty, or a variable profit share, can result in reduced 
development and production in a given area because the reduced margins of 





Lent and Forsythe 
Question #14. The 1978 Amendments containea new bidding systems that the 
Federal Government must use in leasing on the Outer Continental Shelf . 
These so-called alternative bidding systems were established because it 
was believed that there was a lack of "competition" on the Outer Continental 
Shelf. To be honest with you, it doesn't appear to be clear if competition 
meant higher bidding by firms active in OCS oil and gas operations, or 
the bringing on of new firms, or small firms, or whatever. Would you 
please describe the benefit of these bidding systems, if any, and under 
what conditions they may be beneficial? 
Answer. I agree with your observation about the ambiguity in the use of 
the term competition in discussing the OCS program. It appears that at 
least some members of Congress believed that the alternative bidding 
systems included in the 1978 Amendments would increase the number of 
firms participating by bringing in smaller firms, would increase the 
average number of bids sumbitted per tract, and would increase the level 
of the lease revenues collected by the Department. These potential 
benefits, it was hypothesized, would result from shifting at least some 
of the Federal lease revenues from. upfront bonus payments to downstream 
payments such as royalties or profit shares. 
In the tests of ~lternative systems to date, it does not appear that 
significant benefits of the kinds expected are being achieved. This may 
be explained by the fact that the costs of exploration and development 
rather than just the level of the cash bonus, are the major capital 
requirements of participating in OC~ leasing. These costs are not 
significantly affected by the alternative bidding systems. In addition, 
there is clear evidence that the primary determinant of the number of 
bids on a tract is the potential profit from ·~uccessful development. 
Almost all alternative systems that reduce up front bonus payments also 
reduce the portion of the profits from succe>sful development that are 
retained by the lessee. The resulting dampening of the number of bidders 
may offset any gains from firms attracted to bid because of the lower 
capital required for the bonuses . 
• 
Lent and Forsythe 
Question #15. What do you feel is the benefit of being required to 
utilize these alternative bidding systems which, of course, is mandatory 
under Title II of the 1978 Amendments? 
Answer. The testing of alternative systems on at least 20% of the acreage 
offered is mandatory through the five year experimentation period ending in · 
September, 1983 unless the Secretary determines that further testing is 
not consistent with the OCS Lands Act Amendments. The primary benefit of 
this requirement is to provide data that will hopefully resolve the 
question concerning the performance of different bidding systems. Reviews 
to date indicate several of the alternative bidding systems are not 
attractive to bidders nor are they particularly helpful in promoting 
competition. When sufficient data are gathered to offer statistically 
meaningful conclusions about the effectiveness of these bidding systems, 
we will be able to choose those systems for future use which are indeed 




, . . 
Lowry 
Question #1. With the passage of the OCS Lands Act Amendments of 1978, 
it was Congress• intention to reduce the use of the front end cash bonus 
bidding system in favor of alternatives which would increase competition 
and fair market value. In your new proposal to offer some 200 million 
acres of offshore lands per year, do you intend to employ bidding systems 
other than the cash bonus bidding system? 
Answer. The Department intends to continue testing of the most prom1s1ng 
alternative bidding systems to dete~ine whether the) have beneficial 
effects that would warrant their continued use. It is possible that the 
analysis of these test results will identify alternative bidding systems 
that are more suitable under the conditions that will result from expanded 
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To: J':t~ =- ~  I 
From: David ~
Re: Watt v. Energy Action Educational Foundation--No  
The following statutory sections indicate that the 
Secretary of the Interior is not required either to use all of 
the bidding systems enumerated in the statute or to use any 
particular bidding system or systems in addition to the 
traditional cash bonus bid with a fixed royalty: 
1. Congress specifically addressed the nature of the 
Secretary's discretion during the 5 year period of 
experimentation commencing on September 18, 1978. The Congress 
required the Secretary to use alternatives to the traditional 
cash bonus bid/fixed royalty in not less than 20% and not more 
than 60% of the total area offered for leasing each year. But 
the section does not suggest that the Secretary may only fulfill 
this requirement by using alternatives other than those using a 
cash bonus bid--e.g. cash bonus bid/sliding scale royalty. If 
Congress meant to place any further limit on the Secretary's 
discretion why didn't it do so here? 
"The biddings systems authorized by paragraph (1) of 
this subsecton, other than the system authorized by 
subparagraph (A) [the traditional cash bonus/fixed 
royalty], shall be appplied to not less than 20 per 
centum and not more than 60 per centum of the total 
area offered for leasing each year during the five-year 
period beginning on September 18, 1978, unless the 
Secretary determines that the requirements set forth in 
this subparagraph are inconsistent with the purposes 
and policies of this subchapter." 43 u.s.c. § 
1337(a) (5) (B). 
2. Note that in the above quotation the Congress 
provides that the Secretary may even avoid the 20-60% limits on 
his discretion if he determines that the requirement is 
"inconsistent with the purposes and policies of this subchapter." 
This language suggests that Congress did not wish to require the 
Secretary absolutely to use bidding systems other than the 
traditional cash bonus bid/fixed royalty. 
3. 43 u.s.c. § 1337 (a) (9) (e) and 43 u.s.c. § 
1343(2) (A) provide that the Secretary of Energy and the Secretary 
of the Interior shall report to Congress after every fiscal year 
why a particular bidding system has not been used. Certainly 
this indicates Congress' belief that not all of the bidding 
systems will necessarily be used in any one year. And, if not 
~----~ -
all, why should the Secretary be required to use the two systems 
-respondents are so fond of? There is no support for such a view 
in the statutory language. This statutory language supports the 
view that the only limit on the Secretary's discretion is the 20-
60% requirement and even this requirement can be waived. 
43 U.S.C. § 1337(a) (9) (D) & (E) provide: 
"Within six months after the end of each fiscal year, 
the Secretary of Energy, in consulatation with the 
Secretary of the Interior, shall report to the Congress 
with respect to the use of various bidding optionsd 
provided for in this subsection. Such report shall 
include--
(D) if applicable, the reasons why a particular 
bidding system has not been or will not be utilized; 
and 
(E) if applicable, the reasons why more than 60 
per centum or less than 20 per centum of the area 
leased in the past year, or to be offered for lease in 
,. 
·' 
the upcoming year, was or is to be leased under the 
bidding system authorized by subparagraph (A) of 
paragraph (1) of this subsection." 
43 u.s.c. 1343(2) (A) provides: 
"Within six months after the end of each fiscal year, 
the [Interior] Secretary shall submit to the President 
of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of 
Representatives the following reports: 
(2) A report prepared after consultation with the 
Attorney General . . • which shall contain--
{A) an evaluation of the competitive bidding 
systems permitted under the provisions of section 1337 
of this title, and, if applicable, the reasons why a 
particular bidding system has not been utilized." 
4. 43 u.s.c. § 1337)which authorizes the Secretary's 
use of the different bidding systems,states that: "The bidding 
shall be by sealed bid and, at the discretion of the Secretary, 
on the basis of •.• [the 8 different bidding alternatives]." 
There is no indication in the statute that this reference to 
"discretion" is only meant to refer to the period after the 5 
year period of experimentation. I wouldn't rest too heavily on 
the use of the word "discretion" here, but it is some further 
indication that the statute does not seek to closely confine the 
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No. 80-1464 Watt v. Energy Action Educational 
Foundation 
JUSTICE O'CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court. 
s~~ b~-'·' ~~~ 
We are asked to review a decision of the United 
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Cir-
cui t compelling the Secretary of the Interior to exper i-
men t with the use of certain statutorily defined bidding 
systems in awarding leases for oil and gas exploration and 
development on the Outer Continental Shelf. Because the 
2. 
decision below incorrectly construes the Outer Continental 
Shelf Lands Act Amendments of 1978, 43 u.s.c. §1331 et 
~· (1976 ed., Supp. III), we reverse. 
I 
The Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act of 1953 ("OCS 
Lands Act"), 43 u.s.c. §1331 et seq. (1976 ed., Supp. 
I I I) , au thor i zes the Secretary of the Interior to lease 
tracts of the Outer Continental Shelf (OCS) 1 for the ex-
r 
ploration and development of mineral resources, including 
oil and gas. As originally passed, the OCS Lands Act au-
thor i zed the Secretary to solicit sealed bids either by 
fixing a royalty rate of not less than 12-l/2%, and re-
quiring bids on the amount of an initial "cash bonus" to 
be paid at the time the lease was awarded, or by fixing 
the amount of the cash bonus, and requiring bids· on the 
royalty rate. 43 u.s.c. §1337 (a) (1976 ed.). The OCS 
Lands Act vested complete discretion in the Secretary to 
choose between these two bidding systems. In practice, 
prior to 1978 virtually all tracts were leased on the ba-
sis of a fixed royalty of 16-2/3% of the gross value of 
production, with bidding on the amount of the cash bonus. 
See H.R. Rep. No. 95-590, p. 138 (1977); S. Rep. No. 95-
284 ' p. 72 (1977). 
3. 
During the rnid-l970s, the nation's increasing depen-
d e nce on importe d oil focused public attention on the OCS 
a s a pote nti a l source of domestic petroleum. and natural 
gas. See H.R. Rep. No. 95-590, p. 53-54 (1977). At the 
same time, the traditional OCS bidding procedures carne 
unde r close scrutiny because dramatic increases in petro-
l e urn pr ices mad e existing cash bonuses seem miserly rela-
tive to th e r e venues generated from wells on OCS lease-
holds. Membe r s of Congress began to express reservations 
a bou t the a b i lity of the traditional cash bonus, fixed 
r oyalty s ystem to a ssure a fair return to the government, 
principally be c ause i t a ppea red that only the major oil 
companies cou ld risk paying .a large cash bonus to lease a 
t ract of unknown value. Because the number of bidders was 
often limited to a ha ndf ul o f giant concerns, competition 
for t he leases seeme d t e pid , and there was no assurance 
t hat the ultimate re tu r n to th e government was ad e quate. 
See , e . g. , H. R . Rep . No . 95-590, pp. 47, 54 (1977). 
Respo nding to these and other pressur e s for modern-
ization of the OCS La nd s Act, Congress passe d the Outer 
Continental Shelf La nds Act Amendme nts of 1978 ("1978 
Amendments" ), Pub. L . No . 95 -372, 92 Stat. 629. 2 Through 
the 1978 Amendments, Congres s soug ht to expe riment with 
4. 
alte rnatives to the traditional bidding system. To this 
end , it increased the number of authorized bidding systems 
from two to ten, 43 U.S.C. §1337 (a) (1) (1976 · ed., Supp. 
III), and directed the Secretary of the Interior to devel-
op a five-year plan of experimentation with the new sys-
t erns . §1344. Four of the newly authorized systems use a 
c as h bonu s bid (including the cash bonus, fixed royalty 
s ys t e m, which was specific~lly retained in §1337 
(a ) (1) (A)) ,3 thr e e use a royalty rate bid, 4 one uses a 
"pr o f i t s hare" bid, 5 and two use a "work commitment" bid. 6 
Althoug h th e 1978 Amendments, like the original OCS 
Lands Ac t , give th e Secretary of the Interior the discre-
tion to se lect a mong the various authorized bidding sys-
terns , t hat d i s cretion is no longer total. The statute now 
requir es th e Secr etary to ex per imen t with the nine non-
tr a d it iona l syste ms in "not less than 20 per centum and 
not more th a n 6 0 p e r centum of the total area offered for 
l easi ng each y ear," §1337 (a) (5) {B), unless he determines 
that t hose per c e n tage r e quir e me nts are "inconsistent with 
the p urposes a nd polici es " of the 1978 Amendments. 7 
The 19 78 Ame ndme nts assure ongoing congressional 
oversight of the Secr e ta r y of the Interior's leasing ac-
tivities by requiring freq ue nt r e ports to Congress on the 
.. 
.. ~ If'' 
5. 
ope ration of the bidding systems. For example, the Secre-
t ary o f Energy, who has responsibility for issuing regula~ 
tions gove r ning ocs bidding, 8 must report. within six 
months o f th e end of each fiscal year "with respect to the 
use of [the] various bidding options," including "if ap-
p l ica ble , th e reasons why a particular bidding system has 
not bee n o r will not be utilized." §1337 (a) (9) (D). In 
a ddition, the Secretary of the Interior rnus t subrni t each 
/ 
f i s c al year a report that includes "an evaluation of the 
c ompetit iv e bid d i ng systems permitted under [the 1978 
Amendme n ts ], and , i f a pplicable, the reasons why a partie-
u l ar bidding system has no t been utilized," as well as "an 
e valuation o f alterna tive bidding systems not perrni tted 
under [ the 1 9 7 8 Arne ndme n ts ] , and why such sys tern or sys-
terns shou ld or s hou ld not be utili zed." §1343(2). 
To date , t he Sec r e ta r y of Energy has issued regula-
ti o ns for a number of th e bidding systems, including three 
of t he fo u r sys t ems us ing c as h bonus bidding, 45 Fed. Reg. 
9 5 36 ( 198 0) ( the cash bonus bid, fixed royalty sys tern and 
the cash bon us bid , fixed s lid ing-scale royalty system); 
45 Fed . Reg . 36784 (198 0) ( t he cash bonus bid, fixed net 
profit-share system), as wel l as the royalty bid, fixed 
cash bonus system , 45 Fed . Reg. 95 36 (1980), the net 
6. 
profit-share bid, fixed cash bonus system, 46 Fed. Reg. 
29680 (1981), and the work-commitment bid, fixed cash bo-_ 
nus and fixed royalty system, 46 Fed. Reg._ 35614 (1981). 
For his part, the Secretary of the Interior has prepared a 
five-year program for the period from June 198 0 to May 
1985, calling for thirty-six sales, each involving a num-
ber of tracts. Brief for Petitioners 7. The Secretary of 
the Interior has so far used the non-traditional bidding 
/ 
systems in leases covering forty-nine percent of the total 
area offered, but has experimented with only two of the 
nine authorized alternative bidding systems: the cash-
bonus bid, fixed profit-share sys tern, and the cash bonus 
bid, fixed sliding-scale royalty system. Id. , at 8 & 
n.l2. The Secretary of the Interior has not experimented, 
however, with~ of the systems using a factor other than 
the size of a cash bonus as the bidding variable. 9 
II 
This litigation grows out of the Secretary of the 
Interior • s continued reliance on cash bonus bidding sys-
tems. The respondents here, nine consumer groups, two 
state governmental entities, and three private citizens, 
brought suit against the United States, the Secretary of 
the Interior and the Secretary of Energy alleging that the 
7. 
Secretaries had abused their discretion by failing to ex-
periment with bidding systems that do not use the size of 
a cash bonus as the bidding variable. · In essence, they 
complained that bonus bidding cannot generate adequate 
competition to yield a fair market return for OCS oil and 
gas as required by the 1978 Amendments. They sought de-
claratory and injunctive relief prohibiting further lease 
sales until the Secretary of Energy promulgated regula-
/ 
t ions for each of the alternative bidding sys terns, and 
prohibiting the further use of the cash bonus, low royalty 
bidding systems. 
Three days after they filed suit and four days before 
a planned lease sale, the respondents filed a motion for a 
preliminary injunction barring all further lease sales 
until regulations had been promulgated for each of the 
bidding options contained in the 1978 Amendments. The 
District Court denied the mot ion because the respondents 
had not shown a likelihood of prevailing on the merits, 
and because the pace at which the Secretary of Energy was 
issuing regulations was not unlawfully slow in light of 
the complexity involved in preparing such regulations . 10 
The Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court's ruling 
and remanded the case for further proceedings. 
App. D. C. 169, 631 F. 2d 751 (CADC 1979). 
8. 
203 u. s. 
On remand, both parties moved for summary judgment, 
and the respondents renewed their motion for a preliminary 
injunction barring future lease sales until additional 
bidding system regulations had been issued. The District 
Court denied all motions for summary judgment as well as 
the respond~nts• motion for a ?reliminary injunction, and 
the respondents once more appealed. 
This time, the Court of Appeals affirmed the District 
Court only to the extent that it refused to enjoin lease 
sales scheduled for September, October and November 1980. 
Turning to the underlying dispute, the Court concluded 
both that the 1978 Amendments require the Secretary of the 
Interior to ex per imen t with at least some of the bidding 
systems that do not use the size of a cash bonus as the 
bidding variable, and that the Secretary of Energy must 
issue appropriate regulations for the alternative bidding 
systems. 11 
We granted the Government's petition for certiorari 
to review this construction of the 1978 Amendments . 
III 
9 0 
Before examining the merits, we must consider the 
Government's contention that the respondents do not hav~ 
standing to challenge the Secretary of the · Interior's 
choice of bidding systems. 
There are three groups of plaintiffs in this 
litigtion: ( 1) the State of California, which claims 
standing as an involuntary "partner" with the Federal Gov-
ernment in the leasing of OCS tracts in which the underly-
1 
ing pool of gas and oil lies under both the OCS and the 
three-mile coastal belt controlled by California; (2) Cal-
ifornia and the City of Long Beach, which compete with the 
Federal Government in the leasing of off-shore oil and gas 
properties; and (3) consumers of oil and gas and of oil-
and gas-derived products .1 2 Because we find California 
has standing, we do not consider the standing of the other 
plaintiffs. See Arlington Heights v . Metropolitan Housing 
Development Corp, 429 U.S. 252, 264 & n.9 (1977); Buckley 
v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 12 (1976) (per curiam). 
The 1978 Amendments require the Federal Government to 
turn over a fair share of the revenues of an OCS lease to 
the neighboring coastal State whenever the Federal Govern-
ment and the State own adjoining portions of an OCS oil 
and gas pool . See 43 u.s.c. §1337 (g) (4) (1976 ed., 
10. 
Supp. III). California thus has a direct financial stake 
in federal OCS leasing off the California coast. In al-
leging that the bidding systems currently used by the Sec-
retary of the Interior are incapable of producing a fair 
market return, California clearly asserts the kind of 
"distinct and palpable injury," Warth v. Seldin, 422 u.s. 
490, 501 (1975), that is required for standing. 
To demonstrate that it has standing, however, Cali-
/ 
fornia must also show that there is a "fairly traceable" 
causal connection between the injury it claims and the 
conduct it challenges, Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan 
Housing Development Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 261 (1977), so 
that if the relief sought is granted, the injury will be 
redressed, Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org. ,_426 
u.s. 26, 41-46 (1976). The Government argues that the 
relief California seeks--experimental use on some OCS 
lease tracts of non-cash-bonus bidding systems--will not 
ensure that the Secretary will try these systems on par-
eels leased off the California coast. According to the 
Government, even if California were to win its suit, cash 
bonus systems might nevertheless still be used to lease 
tracts overlying California's pools. The Government as-
serts that California therefore lacks standing because it 
•. f. 
11. 
has failed to show that the relief requested would cause 
the Secretary of the Interior to use non-cash-bonus bid-: 
ding systems on California's parcels. 
The essence of California's complaint, however, is 
that the Secretary of the Interior, by failing to test 
non-cash-bonus systems, has breached a statutory obliga-
tion to determine through experiment which bidding system 
works best. According to Calif9rnia, only by testing non-
cash-bonus systems can the Secretary of the Interior carry 
out his duty to use the best bidding systems and thereby 
assure California a fair return for its resources. The 
Government's argument , California contends, improperly 
assumes that the Secretary of the Interior would perverse-
ly refuse to adopt a non-cash-bonus bidding system proven 
by experiment to be superior to the cash bonus alterna-
tives. 
We share California's confidence that, after experi-
mentation, the Secretary would use the most successful 
bidding system on all suitable OCS lease tracts, including 
those off the California coast. For this reason, we agree 
with California that it has standing to challenge the Sec-
retary of the Interior's refusal to experiment with non-
~ . 
12. 
cash-bonus bidding systems. Therefore, we proceed to the 
merits. 
IV 
In passing the 19 78 Amendments, Congress commit ted 
the Government to the goal of obtaining fair market v alu e 
for OCS oil and gas resources. The 1978 Amendments them-
selves proclaim this intention,l 3 and the legislative his-
tory is replete with referencE?s to this purpose. 14 The 
respondents urge that non-cash-bonus bidding systems are 
more likely to achieve the statutory objectives than the 
cash bonus systems used to date, so that the Secretary of 
the Interior's continued reliance on cash bonus bidding 
violates the statutory scheme. 
A 
We begin, as always in a case where the meaning of a 
statute is at issue, by examining Congress' language. If 
Congress meant to restrain the Secretary of the Interior's 
discretion in experimenting with the various alternative 
bidding systems, we can expect the statute to reflect that 
intent. But it docs not. 
Despite the various reservations concerning the tra-
ditional cash bonus bidding system recorded in the legis-
lative history of the 1978 Amendments, Congress not only 
13. 
failed to repudiate the traditional cash bonus, fixed-
royalty system specified in §1337 (a) (1) (A), but affirma-: 
tively directed that the Secretary of the Interior use 
that system in the bidding for tracts covering at least 
forty percent of the total area leased in each year of the 
five-year plan. §1337 (a) (5) (B). The only express limi-
tation Congress put on the use of the traditional system 
was that it not be used on more than eighty percent of the 
f 
total area offered each year. Id. In short, Congress can 
hardly be said to have rejected even the traditional cash-
bonus sys tern. Moreover, among the experimental bidding 
alternatives listed in the 1978 Amendments, Congress ex-
pressly specified cash bonus as the bid variable in three 
systems. 15 Most significantly, Congress left to "the dis-
cretion of the Secretary," §1337 (a) (1), the choice among 
the various nontraditional alternatives, evidently leaving 
to his expert administrative determination the complex, 
technical problem of deciding which alternative bidding 
systems are more likely to further the statute's objec-
tives. In addition , Congress granted the Secretary fur-
ther discretion to abandon the statutory requirements for 
the percentage use of the non-traditional alternatives, 
should he determine that those requirements are inconsis-
14. 
tent with the statutory purposes and policies. §1337 
(a) (5) (B). 
The respondents argue that the Secretary's discretion 
is limited by §1344 (a) (4), which directs that "[l]easing 
activities shall be conducted to assure receipt of fair 
market value for the lands leased and the rights conveyed 
by the Federal Government." According to the respondents, 
the Secretary is violating §1344 (a) (4) by refusing to try 
I 
non-cash-bonus bidding, because cash bonus bidding alleg-
edly does not assure that fair market value is received 
for the Government's resources. 
Sect ion 13 4 4 (a) ( 4) cannot supper t the weight the 
respondents attach to it. Section 1344 directs the Secre-
tary of the Interior to "prepare and periodically revise, 
and maintain an oil and gas leasing program" consistent 
with the "principles" enumerated in §1344 (a) (1)-(4). The 
receipt of fair market value, the fourth listed principle, 
is only one of many general considerations commended to 
the Secretary's attention. 16 The section directs that the 
Secretary's entire leasing program be consistent with the 
principles enumerated . Yet elsewhere the statute requires 
the Secretary's program to use the traditional cash bonus, 
fixed royalty system on as much as eighty percent, and on 
' . ' 
15. 
no less than forty percent, of the acreage leased. §1337 
(a) (5) (B). So Congress cannot have considered the tradi~ 
tional cash bonus system incapable of .providing a fair 
market return, for that is the one system Congress re-
qui red the Secretary to use. We therefore conclude that 
§1344 (a) (4) cannot fairly be read to constrain indirectly 
the Secretary's discretion in choosing to use the alterna-
tive cash bonus bidding systems. · 
I 
The only express statutory check on the Secretary of 
the Interior's discretion is the requirement that he peri-
odically report to the Congress his reasons for failing to 
use any of the alternative bidding systems. 17 The statute 
thus recognizes that, in appropriate circumstances, some 
of the alternative bidding systems may not be used. 
Plainly, Congress considered close congressional scrutiny 
to be sufficient restraint on the Secretary's discretion 
to choose among the statutory options. 
In short , nothing in the statute suggests that Con-
gress intended to channel the Secretary of the Interior's 
discretion in choosing among the alternative bidding sys-
terns, and nothing in the statute singles out the non-cash-
bonus systems for special consideration. Therefore, we 
conclude that the language of the 1978 Amendments requires 
16. 
experimentation with at least some of the new bidding sys-
terns, but leavesthe details to the Secretary's discretion. 
B 
According to the respondents, however, the leg isla-
tive history of the 1978 Amendments mandates constraints 
on the Secretary of the Interior's discretion not express-
ly stated in the statute. In particular, the respondents 
cite the repeated, unfavorable references to "cash bonus" 
I 
bidding found throughout the legislative history to sup-
port their contention that Congress intended to direct the 
Secretary of the Interior to experiment with bidding sys-
tems in which the bidding variable is not the size of a 
cash bonus. 
What clearly emerges from the legislative history, 
however, is not congressional dissatisfaction with all 
forms of cash bonus bidding, but rather with large front-
end payments. Plainly, Congress intended to encourage 
more competitive bidding by requiring experimentation with 
bidding alternatives, regardless of the bid variable in-
volved, that would reduce the size of the front-end pay-
ments associated with the traditional cash bonus bid, 
fixed royalty system. 18 Such a reduction of the front-end 
payments can be achieved, however, with any bidding system 
17. 
that increases the amount of the payments made throughout 
the life of a lease, since a bidder will be willing to pay 
less "up front" if he expects to pay more "downstream." 
This inverse relationship between the size of up front and 
downstream payments holds true, of course, regardless of 
which factor is used as a bidding variable. Congress 
plainly understood this relationship, because it expressly 
included three new cash bonus bid systems among the ex-
/ 
perimental alternatives intended to reduce large front-end 
payments. 
Contrary to the respondents 1 suggestions, Congress 1 
references to "bonus bidding" and the "cash bonus system," 
when seen in context, are merely a shorthand description 
of the traditional cash bonus bid, fixed royalty sys tern 
that was the only system that had been extensively ·used at 
the time the 1978 Amendments were under consideration. 
That the term "bonus bidding" in context refers only to 
the traditional system is evident because Congress point-
edly and repeatedly contrasted the perceived disadvantages 
of "bonus bidding" with its hopes for the alternatives 
listed in §1337 (a) (l) (B)- (G), although three of those 
enumerated alternatives retain the size of a cash bonus as 
the bidding variable. Congressional references to the 
18. 
"cash-bonus sys tern" thus irnpl ica te only the traditional 
system described in §1337 (a) (l) (A) . 19 
v 
In sum, we are unable to find anything, either in the 
legislative history or in the 1978 Amendments themselves, 
that compels the conclusion that the Congress as a whole 
intended to limit the Secretary of the Interior's discre-
tion to choose among the various experimental bidding sys-
/ 
terns. It is not for us, or for the Court of Appeals, to 
decide whether the Secretary of the Interior is well-
advised to forgo exper irnentation with the non-cash-bonus 
alternatives. That question is for Congress alone to an-
swer in the exercise of its oversight powers. 
For these reasons, the judgment of the Court of Ap-
peals compelling the use of non-cash-bonus bidding ·systems 
is hereby reversed. 
1The Outer Continental Shelf is defined by statute to 
mean "all submerged lands lying seaward and outside of the 
area of lands beneath navigable waters and of which 
the subsoil and seabed appertain to the United States and 
are subject to its jurisdiction and control." 43 U.S.C. 
§1331 (a). The term "lands beneath navigable waters" is 
itself given an extensive definition in 43 U.S.C. §1301, 
but generally means the undersea lands within three miles 
of the coast line. 
2The ''basic purpose" of the 1978 Amendments was to 
"promote the swift, orderly and efficient exploitation of 
our almost untapped domestic oil and gas resources in the 
Outer Continental Shelf," H.R. Rep. No. 95-590, p. 53 
(1977), and the Amendments were broadly designed to 
achieve that aim. We are cancer ned here, however, only 
with those provisions of the 1978 Amendments having to do 
with bidding systems for OCS leases. 
f 
3 43 U.S.C. §1337 (a) (1) (1976 ed., Supp. III) autho-
rizes: (1) a "cash bonus bid with a royalty at not less 
than 12-1/2 per centum fixed by the Secretary in amount or 
value of the production saved, removed, or sold," §1337 
(a) (1) (A); (2) a "cash bonus bid ... and a diminishing or 
sliding royalty based on such forumulae as the Secretary 
shall determine as equitable to encourage continued pro-
duction from the lease area as resources diminish, but not 
less than 12-1/2 per centum at the beginning of the lease 
period in amount or value of the production saved, re-
moved , o r so 1 d , " § 13 3 7 ( a ) ( 1 ) ( C ) ; ( 3 ) a " cash bonus bid 
with a fixed share of the net profits of no less ·than 30 
per centum to be derived from the product ion of oil and 
gas from the lease area," §1337 (a) (1) (D); and (4) a "cash 
bonus bid with a royalty at no less than 12-1/2 per centum 
fixed by the Secretary in amount or value of the produc-
tion saved, removed, or sold and a fixed per centum share 
of net profits of no less than 30 per centum to be derived 
from the production of oil and gas from the lease area," 
§1337 (a) (1) (F). 
4section 1337 (a) (1) (B) authorizes: a "variable roy-
alty bid based on a per centum in amount or value of the 
production saved, removed, or sold, with either [1] a 
fixed work commitment based on dollar amount for explora-
tion or [2] a fixed cash bonus as determined by the Secre-
tary, or [3] both." 
5 Sect ion 13 3 7 ( a ) ( 1 ) ( E ) author i z e s a " f i xed cash bo-
nus with the net profit share reserved as the bid vari-
a ble." 
6section 1337 (a) (1) authorizes: (1) a "work commit-
ment bid based on a dollar amount for exploration with a 
fixed cash bonus, and a diminishing or sliding scale roy-
alty based on such formulae as the Secretary shall deter-
mine as equitable to encourage continued production from 
the lease area as resources diminish, but not less than 
12-1/2 per centum at the beginning of the lease period in 
amount or value of the production saved, removed, o~ 
sold," §1337 (a) (1) (C); and (2) a "work commitment bid 
based on a dollar amount for exploration with a fixed cash 
bonus and a fixed royalty in amount or value of the pro-
duction saved, removed, or sold," §1337 (a) (1) (G). 
7section 1337 (a) (9) (E) requires that his determina-
tion be explained to Congress. 
8under the 1978 Amendments, the Secretaries of the 
Interior and of Energy work together on the OCS leasing· 
program. Competitive bidding for OCS leases is to be car-
ried out pursuant to "regulations promulgated in advance," 
§1337 (a) (1), and the Department of Energy Organization 
Act, 42 U.S.C. §§7152 (b), 7153 (1976 ed., Supp. III), 
gives the Secretary of Energy the responsibility for issu-
ing such regulations in consultation with the Secretary of 
Interior. The Secretary of Energy also has authority to 
develop bidding systems other than the ten specifically 
enumerated in §1337 (a) (1), provided any new system has no 
more than one bidding variable and is not disapproved by 
Congress. §1337 (a) (1) (H). 
9Dur ing the course of the present 1 it iga tion, the 
Secretary of the Interior filed an affidavit with the Dis-
trict Court stating that he does not intend to use either 
profi t-sbare or work-commitment bidding· because he does 
"not believe the purposes of the OCS Lands Act or the best 
interests of the nation would be served by the use" of 
either system. Affidavit of James G. Watt, Secretary of 
the Interior, Energy Action Educational Foundation v. 
Watt, No. 79-1633 (D.C.) (sworn May 8, 1981), reprinted in 
App. to Brief for Respondents 2a-3a. The De par tmen t of 
the Interior is on record as disfavoring royalty-share 
bidding as well. See Energy Action Educational Foundation 
v. Andrus, 654 F. 2d 735, 743 n.44 (CADC 1980). 
As reported to Congress, the bidding systems used 
during fiscal years 1978 through 1980 were as follows. In 
fiscal year 19 7 8, three lease sales were held, with 218 
tracts leased. Of those, 3 0 tracts were leased under the 
fixed cash bonus, royalty bid system, 41 under the cash-
bonus bid, sliding scale royalty system, and the remainder 
under the traditional cash bonus bid, fixed 16-2/3% royal-
ty system. Department of the Interior, Outer Continental 
Shelf Oil and Gas Leasing: An Annual Rerort on the Leasing 
and Production Program, Fiscal Year 1978. In fiscal yeat 
1979, five lease sales were held, with 290 tracts leased. 
Of those, 161 were leased under the traditional cash bonus 
bid, 16-2/3% royalty system, and 129 under the cash bonus 
bid, sliding scale royalty system. Department of the In-
terior, Outer Continental Shelf Oi 1 and Gas Leasing: An 
Annual Report on the Leasing and Production Program, Fis-
cal Year 1979. In fiscal year 1980, four lease sales were 
held, with 293 tracts leased. Of those, 136 - tracts were 
leased under the traditional cash bonus bid, 16-2/3% roy-
alty system, 120 under the cash bonus bid, sliding scale 
royalty system, 23 under the cash bonus bid, fixed net 
profit-share system, and 14 under a cash bonus bid, fixed 
33-1/3% royalty system . Department of the Interior, Outer 
Continental Shelf Oil and Gas Leasing Production Program: 
Annual Report, Fiscal year 1980. 
l0479 F. Supp. 62 (DC 1979). 
11 U. S. App. D. C. --, 654 F. 2d 735 (CADC 1980). 
On remand to the District Court, the parties stipu-
lated to the entry of an order requiring the Department of 
Energy to issue final regulations for the net profit-share 
bid, fixed cash bonus system and the work-commitment bid, 
fixed cash bonus and fixed royalty system. Brief for Pe-
titioner 9; Brief for Respondent 5 n.l; see also 46 Fed. 
Reg. 35614, 35615 (1981). Thus, no question is now pre-
sented concerning the Secretary of Energy's duty to issue 
these regulations. The Court of Appeals and the respon-
dents based their conclusion that the Secretary of Energy 
must issue regulations for the alternative systems on the 
theory that the Seer etary of the Interior must use them, 
the issue under consideration here. 
12 In their 
claimed standing 
claim here. The 
permits suit by 
§1349 (a) (1). 
initial complaint, the 
as taxpayers, but have 
1978 Amendments contain 
those having "a valid 
respondents also 
not pressed that 
a provision which 
legal interest." 
13section 1344 (a) (4) states that: "Leasing activi-
ties shall be conducted to assure receipt of fair market 
value for the lands leased and the rights conveyed by the 
Federal Government." 
14 See, e. g., H.R. Rep. No. 95-590, pp. 47, 54 
(1977); S. Rep. No. 95-284, pp. 46, 73 (1977). 
15These three systems are the cash bonus bid, and a 
diminishing or sliding-scale royalty, §1337 (a) (1) (C), the 
cash bonus bid , f i xed net prof i t- share , § 13 3 7 (a) ( 1) (D) , 
and the cash bonus bid, fixed royalty and fixed net 
profit-share, §1337 (a) (1) (F). 
16Also included, for example, are the "economic, so..: 
cial, and environmental values of the renewable and nonre-
newable resources contained in the outer Continental 
Shelf." §1344 (a) (1). In addition, the Conference Report 
indicates that providing a fair return to the Federal Gov-
ernment is only one of many considerations the Secretary 
of the Interior is to weigh: 
The conferees intend that in utilizing the 
new bidding alternatives, a variety of consider-
at ions should be taken in to account, including 
but not limited to: (i) Providing a fair return 
to the, Federal Government;/ (ii) increasing com-
petition; (iii) assuring competent and safe op-
erations; (iv) avoiding undue speculation; (v) 
avoiding unnecessary delays in exploration, de-
velopment, and production; (vi) discovering and 
recovering oil and gas; (vii) developing new oil 
and gas resources in an efficient and timely 
manner; and (viii) limiting administrative bur-
dens on government and industry. 
H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 95-1474, p. 92 (1978). 
The House Report reiterates the point, emphasizing 
that striking the proper balance among the factors is up 
to the Secretary of the Interior: 
One purpose of [the 1978 Amendments] is to 
authorize alternative leasing arrangements and 
require experimentation with them. It will en-
able the Secretary of the Interior, who adminis-
ters the federal leasing program, to strike a 
proper balance between securing a fair return to 
the Federal Government for the lease of its 
lands, increasing competition in exploitation of 
resources , and providing the incentive of a fair 
profit to the oil companies, which must risk 
their investment capital. 
H. R. Rep. No. 9 5-5 9 0 , p. 54 ( 19 7 7) • 
17section 1337 (a) (9) (D) requires the Secretary of 
Energy, in consultation with the Secretary of the Interi-
or, to report to Congress "why a particular bidding system 
has not been or will not be utilized." Section 1343 
( 2 ) (A) requires the Sec r eta r y of the Inter i or to r e po r t to 
Congress "the reasons why a particular . bidding system has 
not been utilized." 
18The Senate Report, S. Rep. No. 95-284, pp. 46-47, 
73 (1977), put it this way: 
S.9 authorizes a wide variety of new bid-
ding systems. These are designed to reduce the 
front end cash bonus, increase the government's 
return on actual production of oil or gas, make 
it easier for smaller companies to enter the OCS 
development business, and increase the avail-
ability of funds for exploration. 
In order to assure that these alternatives 
will be used, the bill limits the Secretary's 
authori ty to use the cash bonus-fixed royalty 
system which has been the historical method of 
OCS bidding ... . t 
The basic thrust of all these new options 
is to reduce the reliance on large front-end 
cash bonuses as the means of obtaining a fair 
price for the public's property. The committee 
wants to authorize lease allocation systems that 
would encourage the widest possible participa-
tion in competitive lease sales consistent with 
receipt by the public of fair market value for 
its resources . The committee believes that net 
profits share and other arrangements can be ef-
fective in shifting Government revenue away from 
initial bon us es and into deferred payments made 
out of a leaseholder's profits based on actual 
production of oil or gas. 
The House Report, H. Rep. No. 95-590, pp. 47, 138-139 
( 19 7 7) , echoes the Senate's conclusions: 
At present , the cash bonus system is used almost 
exclusively . Under that system, in order to win 
a lease , a company must h a ve vast amounts of 
capital, and the price to the company is set 
without full knowledge of the value of the oil 
and gas in the area. This may reduce competi-
tion for offshore leases to the major oil compa-
nies und reduce the public return for resources. 
To increase competitio n for off-shore leases and 
secure higher returns to th e public Treasury, 
s ection 8 of the Outer Continental Shelf Lands 
Act has been amended to allow the Secretary to 
us e other bidding methods based on ne t profits; 
r oyalty; or work commitments stated in dollar 
amounts. 
Witnesses before the committee indicated 
that the high front-end bonus bids may have cre-
ated a barrier to the entry of small and medium-
sized oil firms as well as other potential ex-
ploiters, to the ocs activity, and that these 
types of bids do not, after the completion of 
exploitation of a lease area, provide a fair 
return to the Government. 
the 1977 amendments authorizes [sic] 
new bidding options. The basic thrust of all 
these new options is to reduce the reliance on 
large front-end cash bonuses as the means of 
obtaining a fair price for the public's proper-
ty. . .. 
In order to assure that these new bidding 
alternatives are used, the 1977 amendments limit 
the Secretary's authority to use the cash bonus-
-fixed royalty system, which has been the his-
torical method of OCS bidd~ng .... 
19of many possible, a single example drawn from the 
Conference Report, H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 95-1474, p. 92 
(1978), suffices to demonstrate this point. The Confer-
ence Report summarizes the statutory requirement in 
§1337 (a) (5) (B) that the Secretary of Interior experiment 
with the enumerated alternative bidding systems as fol-
lows: 
Bidding systems other than bonus bidding, in-
cluding royalty, net profit, work commitment, 
and . nonenumerated systems, are to be utilized in 
at least 20 percent and not more than 60 percent 
of the tracts offered for leasing in all OCS 
areas during each of the next 5 years. [Emphasis 
original.] 
Plainly, the reference to "bonus bidding" is to the tradi-
tional system specified in §1337 (a) (l) (A). Otherwise, 
the summary is simply wrong, because three of the enumer-
ated alternatives retain the size of a cash bonus as the 
bidding variable. Similar examples are found throughout 
the legislative history. See H.R. Rep. No. 95-590, pp. 
47, 138-139, 141 (1977); S. Rep. No. 95-284, pp. 46-47 
(1977); H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 95-1474, p. 93 (1978). 
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